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Drawing the Line: The Jurisprudence of 
Non-Consensual Pornography and the 
Implications of Kanye West’s Famous 
Music Video 
KARLA UTSET* 
In June 2016, American rapper Kanye West premiered 
the music video for Famous from his seventh studio album 
“The Life of Pablo.” West’s Famous music video, inspired 
by Vincent Desiderio’s painting Sleep, features nude repli-
cations of several celebrities lying together on a bed. The 
cinematography is voyeuristic, with one journalist describ-
ing the video as “predatory.” In making and publicizing the 
infamous music video, West failed to seek and acquire the 
consent of several of the individuals featured. The produc-
tion received both considerable praise and backlash from 
artists, critics, and the celebrities depicted. 
This Note discusses the jurisprudence of non-consensual 
pornography, known as “revenge porn,” in the United 
States. While non-consensual pornography legislation advo-
cates push for federal criminalization of non-consensual 
pornography, opponents raise issues of First Amendment vi-
olations and “Internet exceptionalism.” This Note explores 
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West’s Famous music video’s relation to NCP, examining 
instances in which art has blurred the line between legal and 
illegal conduct or content. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Non-consensual pornography (“NCP”) is the publication or dis-
tribution of sexually explicit content without the featured individ-
ual’s consent.1 This does not include photographs and recordings of 
people taken in public, or of individuals engaged in flashing or other 
“unsolicited and unlawful sexual” conduct.2 NCP is commonly 
known as “revenge porn,” but this label underrepresents the various 
forms this conduct can take.3 NCP includes the non-consensual dis-
tribution of images originally obtained with consent; the recording 
and distribution of sexual assaults; and the publication of intimate, 
sexual images procured through hacking or other unlawful means.4 
In fact, not all perpetrators are driven by “revenge.” Some are moti-
vated by jealousy, potential notoriety, or an increase in their web-
                                                                                                             
 1 Mary Anne Franks, Combating Non-Consensual Pornography: A Working 
Paper 3 (Sept. 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2336537 [hereinafter Combating NCP]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Mary Anne Franks, Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law Response to 
Revenge Porn, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 15, 2013), https://concurringopin-
ions.com/archives/2013/02/why-we-need-a-federal-criminal-law-response-to-re-
venge-porn.html [hereinafter Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law]. 
 4 Id. 
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site’s traffic; others engage in this behavior as a way to fulfill a sex-
ual desire, or even for no reason at all.5 Abusers in intimate relation-
ships, rapists, and traffickers and pimps use the threat of disclosure 
of NCP to humiliate, control, and prevent their victims from report-
ing their abuse to law enforcement.6 NCP has been described as a 
form of sexual assault, transforming “unwilling individuals into sex-
ual entertainment for strangers.”7 
NCP can cause irreversible harm—victims are often subjected 
to extreme embarrassment, fired from jobs, and harassed by others 
on the Internet.8 Such results can escalate to more serious and vio-
lent consequences, including stalking and sexual assault threats (es-
pecially if the images or recordings are posted with the victim’s con-
tact information).9 Up to 10,000 websites reportedly feature NCP, 
and NCP is widely shared through social media, emails, and text 
messages.10 A 2017 survey by the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative 
(“CCRI”) reported that 12.8% of respondents were either victims of 
or had been threatened with NCP.11 An earlier survey conducted by 
                                                                                                             
 5 Id.; Sarah E. Driscoll, Comment, Revenge Porn: Chivalry Prevails as Leg-
islation Protects Damsels in Distress over Freedom of Speech, 21 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 75, 79 (2016). 
 6 Mary Anne Franks, Drafting an Effective ‘Revenge Porn’ Law: A Guide 
for Legislators 3 (Aug. 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468823 [hereinafter Drafting an Ef-
fective ‘Revenge Porn’ Law]. 
 7 Combating NCP, supra note 1, at 4. 
 8 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 79–80. 
 9 Drafting an Effective ‘Revenge Porn’ Law, supra note 6, at 2, 10–11. 
Eighty-two percent of victims suffer “significant impairment in social, occupa-
tional, or other important areas of functioning,” 49% “have been harassed or 
stalked online by users that have seen the material” online, and 30% “have been 
harassed or stalked outside of the Internet (in person, over the phone) by users 
that have seen the material online.” Id. For an example of the potential reach of 
the harassment that victims and their families endure, see Brooke Jarvis, How One 
Woman’s Digital Life Was Weaponized Against Her, WIRED (Nov. 14, 2017, 6:00 
AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-one-womans-digital-life-was-weapon-
ized-against-her/. 
 10 Mary Anne Franks, Revenge Porn Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 
69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 1260 (2017) [hereinafter Revenge Porn Reform]; Drafting 
an Effective ‘Revenge Porn’ Law, supra note 6, at 2. 
 11 ASIA A. EATON ET AL., CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, 2017 
NATIONWIDE ONLINE STUDY OF NONCONSENSUAL PORN VICTIMIZATION AND 
PERPETRATION 11 (2017). 
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the CCRI found that 93% of victims “suffered significant emotional 
distress,” with 51% revealing they had experienced “suicidal 
thoughts due to being a victim.”12 
In June 2016, American rapper Kanye West premiered the music 
video for Famous from his seventh studio album “The Life of 
Pablo.”13 West’s Famous music video, inspired by Vincent Desid-
erio’s painting Sleep, features nude replications of several celebri-
ties lying together on a bed.14 The cinematography is voyeuristic, 
with one journalist describing the video as “predatory.”15 In making 
and publicizing the infamous music video, West failed to seek and 
acquire the consent of several of the individuals featured.16 The pro-
duction received both considerable praise and backlash from artists, 
critics, and the celebrities depicted.17 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects 
freedom of expression, but labeling content as “art” does not auto-
matically shield it from governmental intrusion.18 Although the 
United States government seldom restricts art based on its content, 
art continues to be regulated through content-neutral restrictions af-
fecting numerous activities and disciplines.19 The effects of these 
restrictions on artistic expression are exemplified by child pornog-
raphy laws, which have played a substantial role in proscribing the 
subjects and muses featured in acclaimed photographers’ oeuvres.20 
                                                                                                             
 12 Drafting an Effective ‘Revenge Porn’ Law, supra note 6, at 10–11. 
 13 Dirk Standen, Exclusive: Kanye West on His “Famous” Video, Which 
Might Be His Most Thought-Provoking Work Yet, VANITY FAIR (June 24, 2016, 
10:54 PM), http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2016/06/kanye-famous-video-in-
terview. 
 14 Janelle Zara, Naked Bodies ‘Expanding and Contracting’: A Look Inside 
Kanye West’s Exclusive ‘Famous’ Exhibition, CNN: STYLE, http://www.cnn.com/
style/article/kanye-west-famous-exhibition/index.html (last updated Aug. 29, 
2016). 
 15 T.C. Sottek, Kanye West’s Video for Famous Is Damn Genius Clickbait, 
THE VERGE (June 25, 2016, 7:49 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/6/25/
12031774/kanye-west-taylor-swift-donald-trump-kim-kardashian-rihanna-bill-
cosby-george-bush-caitlyn-jenner. 
 16 See infra Section IV.A.2.i. 
 17 See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 18 Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 
174, 184 (2011). 
 19 Id. 
 20 See infra Section III.B. 
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Part II of this Note describes the jurisprudence of NCP in the 
United States by examining current laws and remedies afforded to 
victims. Part II also explores proposed additions to and changes in 
NCP law suggested by scholars and NCP law advocates. Part III ad-
dresses the First Amendment’s application in combating NCP legis-
lation, and counterarguments to the First Amendment protection of 
NCP. Additionally, Part III examines instances in which art has 
blurred the line between legal and illegal conduct or content. Part IV 
discusses Kanye West’s Famous music video, including its produc-
tion and reception, as well as the legal remedies the nonconsenting 
individuals featured may have. Part IV also analyzes West’s Famous 
video’s relation to NCP by considering potential additions to anti-
NCP legislative proposals that would protect individuals from vir-
tual NCP and preserve freedom of expression. Finally, Part V con-
cludes by addressing the blurred line between legal and illegal ex-
pression, especially in the art realm. 
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF NON-CONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY 
A. Federal Law 
Over the past several years, the enactment of anti-NCP legisla-
tion has been gaining traction at an international level. The Philip-
pines became the first country to criminalize NCP in 2009.21 In 
2013, the Australian state of Victoria outlawed NCP.22 In 2014, 
Canada criminalized NCP, followed by England, Wales, and New 
Zealand in 2015.23 In 2014, Israel classified NCP as a form of sexual 
assault, becoming the first country to do so.24 Other countries—in-
cluding Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the United States—have also 
taken strides to combat NCP.25 
Currently, the United States has no federal laws expressly pro-
hibiting the distribution of NCP.26 While our nation has laws regu-
lating computer hacking, video voyeurism, stalking, and record-
                                                                                                             
 21 Drafting an Effective ‘Revenge Porn’ Law, supra note 6, at 3. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 80 n.17. 
 26 Combating NCP, supra note 1, at 3. 
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keeping requirements for pornography producers, these laws are cri-
tiqued as offering incomplete protection to NCP victims and are 
deemed inadequate in deterring NCP distribution.27 
For example, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act prohibits and 
punishes certain forms of computer hacking and distribution of in-
formation obtained from such conduct.28 While this legislation may 
protect the subset of NCP victims whose images have been obtained 
and distributed pursuant to a computer hacking scheme, it is inap-
plicable to the majority of NCP cases.29 The Video Voyeurism Pre-
vention Act of 2004 prohibits “the intent to capture an image of a 
private area of an individual without their consent” when “the indi-
vidual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”30 This Act too 
is considered inadequate in addressing the full scope of NCP for two 
main reasons: (1) the Act’s language limits the prohibition to the 
“maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States”; and (2) 
the Act fails to acknowledge the context and importance of consent 
in situations where the sexually explicit material is initially consen-
sually produced or shared with an individual, but that same individ-
ual’s subsequent access to or distribution of the material is not con-
sented to.31 In this situation, the consent provided is limited. For ex-
ample, a man decides to share a sexually explicit photograph of him-
self with his partner but does not consent to his partner sharing or 
distributing the photograph. 
The Record Keeping Requirements Act sets record-keeping re-
quirements for producers of sexually explicit content.32 This Act is 
inapplicable to NCP because it focuses almost exclusively on docu-
mentation regarding the name and age of those portrayed, not the 
verification of the portrayed individual’s consent to the use and dis-
tribution of his or her images or videos.33 The Interstate Anti-Stalk-
ing Punishment and Prevention Act prohibits the use of “mail, any 
interactive computer service, or any . . . interstate or foreign com-
                                                                                                             
 27 Id. See generally Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3. 
 28 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
 29 Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3. 
 30 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012). 
 31 Id.; accord Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3. 
 32 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (2012). 
 33 Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3. 
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merce to engage in a course of conduct that causes substantial emo-
tional distress to [a] person or places [a] person in reasonable fear of 
the death of, or serious bodily injury to” that person, a member of 
the immediate family of that person, or a spouse or intimate partner 
of that person.34 The Act requires the actor to have an “intent to kill, 
injure, harass, intimidate, or place under surveillance with intent to 
kill, injure, harass, or intimidate anoth er person.”35 While this Act 
has the potential to apply to some NCP instances, it is not generally 
interpreted in this manner, with sanctions usually reserved for those 
who are persistent in their harassment.36 Additionally, many perpe-
trators claim their sole intention in distributing NCP is “to obtain 
notoriety, fulfill some sexual desire, or increase traffic for their web-
sites,” and therefore do not satisfy the Act’s intent requirement.37 
Making matters more difficult for NCP victims and anti-NCP 
legislation advocates, Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act (“CDA”) explicitly shields website hosts and providers from 
NCP suits.38 Section 230 was enacted after Stratton Oakmont, Inc. 
v. Prodigy Services Co., in which a New York court held that an 
Internet service provider’s (“ISP”) exercise of editorial control and 
regulation of content in its online bulletin board rendered the pro-
vider a publisher, and therefore liable for defamatory comments 
posted on the bulletin board.39 Following Stratton, ISPs were appre-
hensive over potential liability for the acts and postings of their us-
ers, and were therefore discouraged from monitoring hosted con-
tent.40 In response, legislators enacted Section 230, which states that 
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer shall be treated as 
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another.”41 
                                                                                                             
 34 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3; Salina Tariq, Com-
ment, Revenge: Free of “Charge?”, 17 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV 227, 244 
(2014). 
 37 Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3. 
 38 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012); Jenna K. Stokes, Comment, The Indecent Internet: 
Resisting Unwarranted Internet Exceptionalism in Combating Revenge Porn, 29 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 929, 932 (2014). 
 39 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 
323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
 40 Stokes, supra note 38, at 932–33. 
 41 47 U.S.C. § 230; accord Stokes, supra note 38, at 932–33. 
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In 1997, Zeran v. America Online, Inc. expanded Section 230’s 
reach by broadening immunity to distributors, not just publishers, of 
content.42 Today, Section 230 has been broadly read by courts to 
immunize providers and users of interactive computer services from 
claims involving defamation, “negligent assistance in the distribu-
tion of child pornography, misappropriation of the right of publicity, 
and invasion of privacy.”43 
In 2008, the Ninth Circuit provided a narrow interpretation of 
Section 230’s protection by declining to grant immunity to an ISP 
when its actions, in the form of solicitation of discriminatory hous-
ing preferences, constituted a direct contribution to unlawful con-
duct.44 In 2014, NCP victims sought to hold GoDaddy liable for 
NCP content uploaded to the website Texxxan.com.45 The Texas 
Court of Appeals held that GoDaddy, the former domain registrar 
and hosting provider for Texxxan.com, was protected by Section 
230 of the CDA and consequently not liable for NCP content up-
loaded to Texxxan.com.46 The court reasoned that GoDaddy was not 
involved in the creation or development of the content.47 These two 
cases, taken together, demonstrate that courts interpreting Section 
230 sharply distinguish between ISPs “who simply host third-party 
content and those who actively participate in the creation of illegal 
content.”48 
In March 2017, Thomas Brennan, a journalist and Marine vet-
eran, discovered a Facebook page where active and veteran service 
members of the United States “were allegedly sharing nude 
photo[graph]s of female Marines without their consent.”49 Members 
                                                                                                             
 42 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
the theory of distributor liability “is merely a subset, or a species, of publisher 
liability”); Stokes, supra note 38, at 933. 
 43 Stokes, supra note 38, at 934 (footnote omitted). 
 44 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 
F.3d 1157, 1167–71 (9th Cir. 2008); Stokes, supra note 38, at 935. 
 45 GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 753 (Tex. App. 2014); 
Stokes, supra note 38, at 935–36. 
 46 GoDaddy.com, 429 S.W.3d at 762. 
 47 Id. at 756–62. 
 48 Andrew McDiarmid, Decisive Section 230 Victory for GoDaddy in Re-
venge Porn Case, CDT: BLOG (April 15, 2014), https://cdt.org/blog/decisive-sec-
tion-230-victory-for-godaddy-in-revenge-porn-case/. 
 49 Rebecca Kheel, Senators Introduce Military ‘Revenge Porn’ Bill, THE 
HILL (June 7, 2017, 2:44 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/defense/336771-senators-
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of the Facebook page left distasteful and, at times, violent comments 
about the women featured in the posted photographs.50 The situation 
was dubbed the “Marines United” scandal, named after the title of 
the Facebook page.51 Following the initial discovery, numerous ad-
ditional websites and sharing platforms used by members of all 
branches of the military to share NCP featuring active and veteran 
female service members came to light.52 Although the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), which enumerates criminal of-
fenses under military law, “bans [the] taking [of] nude 
photo[graph]s without consent, it does not address [the] sharing [of] 
photo[graph]s without consent.”53 Following the scandal, Arizona 
Representative Martha McSally introduced a bill titled the Protect-
ing the Rights of Individuals Against Technological Exploitation 
(PRIVATE) Act.54 At the time of this writing, the PRIVATE Act 
passed in the House of Representatives, was received by the Senate, 
and “read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Ser-
vices.”55 If the PRIVATE Act becomes law, it will amend the UCMJ 
to make the sharing of NCP a punishable offense under military law, 
                                                                                                             
introduce-military-revenge-porn-bill; accord Ryan Browne, First Marine Tied to 
‘Marines United’ Facebook Group Court-Martialed, CNN (July 10, 2017, 5:56 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/10/politics/marines-united-facebook-group-
court-martial/index.html; Christine Schmidt, After Blowing the Life Off of the Ma-
rines United Scandal, The War Horse Wants to Improve Journalism on Veterans 
and Trauma, NIEMANLAB (Aug. 1, 2017, 10:16 AM), http://www.nieman-
lab.org/2017/08/after-blowing-the-lid-off-of-the-marines-united-scandal-the-
war-horse-wants-to-improve-journalism-on-veterans-and-trauma/. 
 50 Kheel, supra note 49. 
 51 See Alex Ward, The Military May Soon Consider Revenge Porn a Criminal 
Act, VOX (Sept. 20, 2017, 3:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2017/9/20/16340140/
military-congress-revenge-porn-marines-united. 
 52 David Martin, Marines Nude Photo Scandal Expands to All Branches of 
Military, CBS NEWS (Mar. 10, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/marines-nude-photo-scandal-expands-to-military-wide-explicit-message-
board/; Paul Szoldra, The Marine Corps’ Nude-Photo-Sharing Scandal Is Even 
Worse than First Realized, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 9, 2017, 4:04 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/nude-photo-marine-corps-pentagon-scandal-
2017-3. 
 53 Kheel, supra note 49; accord Ward, supra note 51. 
 54 Kheel, supra note 49; H.R.2052 - PRIVATE Act, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2052 (last visited Dec. 
6, 2017). 
 55 H.R. 2052, 115th Cong., 2017 CONG US HR 2052 (Westlaw). 
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essentially protecting service members “regardless of where they are 
serving.”56 
B. State Criminal Laws 
Despite, and perhaps because of, the lack of express federal law 
prohibiting the creation and distribution of NCP in the United States, 
thirty-eight states and Washington, D.C. have enacted NCP laws, 
with New Jersey becoming the first to do so in 2004.57 Punishments 
in these jurisdictions range from monetary fines to prison time, and 
may even carry felony penalties.58 Advocates for a federal NCP law 
highlight that although state recognition and state-enacted NCP laws 
are steps in the right direction and necessary to address conduct that 
does not cross state lines, this state-specific approach is inherently 
limited.59 The most obvious limitation is the restricted jurisdiction 
of state laws, which varies by statute and in some instances leaves 
victims outside Washington, D.C. and the thirty-eight states that 
have enacted NCP laws without criminal remedies against their per-
petrators.60 Additionally, some state laws are challenged as being 
unconstitutional and consequently subjected to strict scrutiny anal-
ysis, thus requiring the state to prove that “it has a compelling inter-
est in enacting the legislation and . . . the legislation is narrowly tai-
lored to achiev[e] [this] . . . interest.”61 Furthermore, some state NCP 
                                                                                                             
 56 Kheel, supra note 49 (quoting statement by Republican Senator Dean Hel-
ler of Nevada); accord Ward, supra note 51. 
 57 38 States + DC Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS 
INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited 
Dec. 6, 2017); Stokes, supra note 38, at 941. 
 58 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 83; Drafting an Effective ‘Revenge Porn’ Law, 
supra note 6, at 4. 
 59 Stokes, supra note 38, at 941–46; Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, 
supra note 3; Combating NCP, supra note 1, at 9. 
 60 Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3. Many states claim 
jurisdiction not only in cases in which the victim is a resident of the state, but also 
in cases in which the perpetrator resides in the state. Some broad statutes claim 
jurisdiction in cases in which the NCP is viewed in the state. See generally 38 
States + DC Have Revenge Porn Laws, supra note 57; Revenge Porn Laws by 
State, FINDLAW, http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-charges/revenge-porn-
laws-by-state.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2018). 
 61 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 95 (footnote omitted). For a more in-depth anal-
ysis of the challenges and limitations of current state-enacted NCP laws, see id. at 
97–107. 
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laws are criticized as providing little to no improvement to victims’ 
remedies, requiring a majority of those harmed by NCP to resort to 
civil litigation.62 
C. Civil Remedies 
In the absence of federal legislation, and in states where no NCP 
law has been enacted or has been enacted but deemed inadequate to 
address victim claims, NCP victims resort to civil litigation reme-
dies.63 
1. PRIVACY LAW 
Privacy rights are not expressly enumerated in the Constitution, 
but the right to privacy is recognized judicially and statutorily in 
many states.64 In 1890, Justices Earl Warren and Louis Brandeis 
wrote The Right to Privacy, an article recognizing that privacy rights 
stem from the rise in use of new technologies, which caused worry 
over the public exposure of private information.65 The duty of trust, 
Warren and Brandeis specified, precludes an individual from pub-
lishing, without consent, content pertaining to another’s private 
life.66 Privacy law has been codified into four separate tort claims 
incorporated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, including: “(1) 
intrusion of solitude, (2) public disclosure of private facts, (3) plac-
ing a person in false light in the public eye, and (4) appropriation of 
name or likeness.”67 
a. Intrusion of Solitude 
An intrusion of solitude claim68 is valid when one “intentionally 
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of 
                                                                                                             
 62 Stokes, supra note 38, at 943. 
 63 See id. See generally Combating NCP, supra note 1; Driscoll, supra note 
5; Benjamin A. Genn, Comment, What Comes Off, Comes Back to Burn: Revenge 
Pornography as the Hot New Flame and How It Applies to the First Amendment 
and Privacy Law, 23 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 163 (2014). 
 64 Genn, supra note 63, at 171, 171 n.46. 
 65 Id.; Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L. REV. 193, 195–96 (1890). 
 66 Genn, supra note 63, at 172. 
 67 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 68 The elements required for an intrusion of solitude claim are as follow: (1) 
a defendant physically or electronically intrudes into an individual’s solitude 
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another or his private affairs or concerns.”69 In Cason v. Baskin, the 
Supreme Court of Florida, referencing Warren and Brandeis, stated 
that matters concerning the “private life, habits, acts[,] and relations 
of an individual” are protected from intrusion.70 In Cason, the court, 
noting that individuals retain possessory interests in the content of 
personal facts, held that the unauthorized publication of the plain-
tiff’s life history violated her privacy.71 
In the case of NCP, when an individual shares an intimate pho-
tograph or video of himself with his partner, he likely trusts the pri-
vate content will not be published by his partner without his consent. 
In accordance with Cason and the elements required for the tort, in-
trusion of solitude could occur if the depicted individual’s partner 
shares the private content without the individual’s consent or author-
ization, especially if the individual intended the “sexually explicit 
[material] to remain private and protected through an implied con-
tract, duty of trust, or duty of confidence”;72 “all of which are present 
and relied upon in . . . dating, spousal, and sexual relationship[s].”73 
b. Public Disclosure of Private Facts 
A public disclosure of private facts74 occurs when unwanted 
publicity is given “to a matter concerning the private life of an-
other,” and the matter publicized is not of public concern and 
                                                                                                             
without authorization; (2) a reasonable person would find the intrusion objection-
able or highly offensive; (3) the defendant intruded upon a private matter; and (4) 
the intrusion caused harm in the form of anguish and suffering. Id.; see also Mel-
vin v. Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 1013–14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
 69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PRIVACY § 652B (1977). 
 70 Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 252 (Fla. 1944) (quoting Warren & 
Brandeis, supra note 65, at 216). 
 71 Id. at 248. 
 72 Genn, supra note 63, at 186. 
 73 Id. at 185 (footnote omitted). These “dut[ies] generally continue[] after a 
separation . . . .” Id. at 186. 
 74 For a public disclosure of private facts claim to be valid, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that: (1) the defendant published information not known to the pub-
lic; (2) the information published is personal and neither a legitimate concern to 
the public nor newsworthy; (3) a reasonable person would be offended by its dis-
closure; and (4) the personal information was widely communicated to the public. 
Id. at 173; see also Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 WL 3126229, 
at *4 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009) (stating publication to the public can consist of the 
public at large, or as little as five people). 
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“would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”75 A fact is 
deemed private when society is willing to accept the plaintiff’s ex-
pectation of privacy as reasonable.76 Relevant to NCP, Peterson v. 
Moldofsky concludes that an individual’s sexual activity is personal 
and not newsworthy information, such that a reasonable person 
would be offended by the wide disclosure of such information.77 Ad-
ditionally, the publicity requirement does not require the content to 
be disclosed to the public at large; “publicity may also include dis-
closure to those with ‘a special relationship with the plaintiff,’” such 
as family members and work colleagues.78 While several courts 
have found defendants liable under this tort in NCP cases,79 once the 
images are made public, “the prevailing law of invasion of privacy 
generally recognizes that the interests in privacy fade,” thus leaving 
NCP suits to fail under this cause of action.80 
c. False Light in the Public Eye 
False light in the public eye81 occurs when an individual know-
ingly or with reckless disregard publicizes content that places the 
person depicted in a false light before the public.82 The theory ani-
mating this cause of action in NCP cases is that when an individual 
                                                                                                             
 75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PRIVACY § 652D (1977). 
 76 Zieve v. Hairston, 598 S.E.2d 25, 30 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). 
 77 Peterson, 2009 WL 3126229, at *2–5; accord Genn, supra note 63, at 174 
n.60. 
 78 Adrienne N. Kitchen, Comment, The Need to Criminalize Revenge Porn: 
How a Law Protecting Victims Can Avoid Running Afoul of the First Amendment, 
90 CHI-KENT L. REV 247, 256 (2015) (quoting Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 
411 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
 79 Id. at 256–57; see, e.g., Doe v. Hofstetter, No. 11-CV-02209-DME-MJW, 
2012 WL 2319052, at *2 (D. Colo. June 13, 2012); Taylor v. Franko, No. 09-
00002JMS/RLP, 2011 WL 2746714, at *2, *5 (D. Haw. July 12, 2011). 
 80 Kitchen, supra note 78, at 256–57 (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 
U.S. 469, 494–95 (1975)). 
 81 A false light in the public eye claim is valid when the plaintiff demonstrates 
that: (1) the defendant published facts that render a false impression of the plain-
tiff; (2) the facts were published with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless 
disregard for the truth; (3) the publication was distributed to a reasonable number 
of people; and (4) a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would object to 
the publication. Genn, supra note 63, at 174; see also Cantrell v. Forest City 
Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 249–50 (1974). 
 82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PRIVACY § 652E (1977). 
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posts a sexually explicit photograph of his current or former partner 
to an adult services website, including with it personal facts and de-
tails, he may be knowingly and falsely portraying his partner as an 
escort.83 Alternatively, if the sexually explicit content is posted to a 
website that specifically operates as an NCP website, there is no 
false portrayal that the individual depicted is an escort, but that post-
ing may still render a false impression.84 These theories are weak 
because false light claims only have the potential to cover a narrow 
band of NCP cases. 
d. Appropriation of Name or Likeness 
To succeed on an appropriation of name or likeness claim, a 
plaintiff must show his or her name or likeness was used by the de-
fendant, without authorization, for commercial benefit.85 This claim 
includes the use of both photographs and portraits.86 To prove such 
a claim in an NCP matter, the plaintiff has the difficult burden of 
demonstrating his or her name or likeness has substantial value and 
the defendant used his or her name or likeness in a commercial ca-
pacity.87 The plaintiff’s burden is heightened because NCP is rarely 
used for commercial benefit, but “more as an avenue of retribution 
and schadenfreude.”88 
Despite their application in some NCP cases, the troubling irony 
of privacy actions is that to be effective, they often require further 
disclosure of the very content that is harming the victim.89 
2. TORT LAW 
a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress90 (“IIED”) originated as a 
                                                                                                             
 83 Genn, supra note 63, at 189. 
 84 Id. at 189–90. 
 85 Id. at 175. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 190. 
 88 Id. at 190–91 (footnote omitted). 
 89 Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3. 
 90 In establishing a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defend-
ant acted with an intention to cause severe emotional harm or with reckless disre-
gard of consequential harm; (2) the action was extreme or outrageous; (3) and the 
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catch-all covering the narrow instance when an individual’s “con-
duct exceeded all permissible bounds of a civilized society but an 
existing tort claim was unavailable.”91 At the heart of the tort is the 
outrageousness element, which takes into account the relationship 
of the parties, whether there was an abuse of a position of power, 
the vulnerability of the individual harmed and the actor’s knowledge 
of this, the actor’s motive, and the persistence of the conduct.92 Out-
rageousness under IIED is contextual, fact-driven, and flexible 
enough to evolve with society.93 Given this flexibility, some schol-
ars have deemed IIED to be particularly applicable in addressing 
NCP claims.94 
Notwithstanding this support, some critics have maintained that 
NCP plaintiffs have difficulty proving the “intent to cause severe 
emotional harm” and “extreme or outrageous conduct” elements.95 
Moreover, “[t]he general rule in the Restatement is there is no lia-
bility for pure emotional distress, without resulting bodily harm or 
any other invasion of the [plaintiff’s] interests.”96 Consequently, if 
an NCP victim is unable to demonstrate he incurred more than rep-
utational or mental harm, his IIED claim fails as a matter of law. 
b. Defamation 
Defamation97 occurs when an individual makes a false and de-
famatory statement or representation regarding another, and pub-
lishes it to a third party.98 Because truth constitutes a complete de-
                                                                                                             
action caused the plaintiff actual severe emotional harm. Driscoll, supra note 5, 
at 113. 
 91 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 46 cmt. a 
(2012). 
 92 Stokes, supra note 38, at 948. 
 93 Id. (stating courts have found words to sometimes fit the standard). 
 94 Id. at 949–52. 
 95 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 112–14. 
 96 Kitchen, supra note 78, at 257–58 (alteration in original)(internal quota-
tions omitted). 
 97 For a defamation claim to be valid, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the 
defendant made a false, defamatory statement about the plaintiff; (2) the statement 
was published to a third party; (3) the publisher acted with negligence; and (4) 
either the plaintiff was harmed by the publication, or the publication is actionable 
irrespective of harm. Driscoll, supra note 5, at 112. 
 98 Id. 
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fense, a defamation suit is better suited for untrue statements or de-
pictions.99 In NCP cases, a defendant may avoid liability if she 
demonstrates that because the victim is the individual depicted in 
the sexually explicit content, “[he] committed the depicted acts.”100 
Despite this, at least one court (a district court in Hawaii) has found 
that when an individual publishes another’s sexually explicit image 
with identifying information and without authorization, such con-
duct constitutes a defamatory statement.101 
3. COPYRIGHT LAW 
Copyright law allows the individual who took the photograph or 
video to register the copyright of the material, and consequently pro-
hibits the unauthorized and non-consensual publication or distribu-
tion of the material.102 Copyright law is especially helpful to NCP 
victims because Section 230 of the CDA does not immunize ISPs 
from copyright claims, meaning victims who own the copyright to 
their images or videos can demand the ISP remove the content.103 
Sadly, this law covers only the fraction of NCP victims who took 
the photographs or videos themselves, which encompasses only 
about 20% of all NCP victims.104 Although, pursuant to the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, registration of a copyright is not re-
quired to send a notice and takedown request to an individual or en-
tity one believes is infringing on his or her copyright, it is still re-
quired to file a lawsuit against that individual or entity in the event 
they refuse to do so.105 As with privacy law concerns, registering the 
copyright may require the victim to disclose more personal infor-
mation, and in extreme cases can require the victim to send nude 
                                                                                                             
 99 Kitchen, supra note 78, at 255–56. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Taylor v. Franko, No. 09-00002 JMS/RLP, 2011 WL 2746714, at *5 (D. 
Haw. July 12, 2011); Driscoll, supra note 5, at 113. 
 102 See Stokes, supra note 38, at 937; Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, 
supra note 3. 
 103 Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3. 
 104 Id.; Stokes, supra note 38, at 941 n.80. 
 105 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 
2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see Mallory 
Donick, Is a Registered Copyright Necessary for a DMCA Takedown?, 
TRAVERSELEGAL (July 21, 2017), https://www.traverselegal.com/blog/is-a-regis-
tered-copyright-necessary-for-a-dmca-takedown/. 
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photographs of him- or herself to the copyright office in Washing-
ton, D.C.106 
4. THE LIMITS OF ALL 
While the above civil actions have helped many NCP victims, 
they are riddled with limitations that render them inadequate in ad-
dressing various NCP situations.107 For example, civil litigation im-
poses a tremendous financial burden on the plaintiff/victim and, in 
most cases, the commencement of an NCP lawsuit means that the 
objectionable content will become public record.108 Another limita-
tion is that civil remedies, except for copyright law, are sought 
against the uploader directly, and finding, identifying, and proving 
the uploader’s identity may be an impossible feat considering the 
anonymity of the Internet and Internet service providers’ reluctance 
to disclose user identities.109 Moreover, most civil actions award 
only monetary damages and do not result in the content being re-
moved from websites, which is the priority of most NCP victims, 
thus leaving victims with an inadequate remedy.110 Even in cases 
where damages have been awarded, findings show that many civil 
defendants cannot satisfy any significant monetary judgments.111 
Although criminal litigation suffers from many of the same limita-
tions civil litigation does, it may still be a more beneficial and effec-
tive route for victims because it shifts the burden of pursuing the 
                                                                                                             
 106 LastWeekTonight, Online Harassment: Last Week Tonight with John Oli-
ver (HBO), YOUTUBE (June 21, 2015), at 9:00, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=PuNIwYsz7PI&feature=youtu.be [hereinafter John Oliver]. 
 107 See Combating NCP, supra note 1, at 4–6. See generally Stokes, supra note 
38; Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3; John Oliver, supra note 
106. 
 108 Stokes, supra note 38, at 950; John Oliver, supra note 106, at 8:20; Why 
We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3; Combating NCP, supra note 1, 
at 5. 
 109 Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3; Combating NCP, 
supra note 1, at 4; see Stokes, supra note 38, at 950; see, e.g., Jarvis, supra note 
9. 
 110 This does not include copyright claims, which if proven can result in the 
removal of the image or video. Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 
3; see Combating NCP, supra note 1, at 4; Stokes, supra note 38, at 937, 950. 
 111 Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3; see Driscoll, supra 
note 5, at 115. 
938 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:920 
 
case to the government and “offer[s] greater potential for deterrence 
than the . . . threat of civil action.”112 
D. Proposed Additions and Changes to the Law 
“[T]here is a serious push from state lawmakers and victims 
alike for more state laws to be enacted, for currently enacted laws to 
have harsher consequences, or, ultimately, for a federal law crimi-
nalizing [NCP] to be proposed and enacted.”113 
1. EXPANDING SECTION 230 OF THE CDA 
Section 230 of the CDA explicitly states that ISPs in federal 
criminal cases cannot claim immunity.114 Some NCP victim advo-
cates propose an expansion of this restriction to include NCP content 
and material, but such expansion is critiqued as having the potential 
to complicate the law.115 Additionally, critics argue that broadening 
this restriction to NCP cases may affect the entire “free speech eco-
system” by influencing ISPs to pick and choose which content they 
will host, even if the content is legal.116 But the language of Section 
230 demonstrates this argument is without merit. Section 230 con-
tains a provision granting ISPs immunity from constitutional claims 
brought against them in situations where they voluntarily and in 
good faith, “restrict access to or availability of material that the pro-
vider . . . considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, exces-
sively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”117 Thus far, 
Twitter and Reddit have banned NCP from their websites, Google 
has begun to remove images of NCP victims upon request, and, 
since the Marines United scandal, Facebook has developed and re-
leased guidelines for “curb[ing] the sharing of [NCP].”118 Moreover, 
                                                                                                             
 112 Revenge Porn Reform, supra note 10, at 1300. 
 113 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 83 (footnote omitted). 
 114 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012); see Stokes, supra note 38, at 930. 
 115 Stokes, supra note 38, at 930–31. 
 116 See id. 
 117 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). In fact, the stated policy behind Section 230 is 
“to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish traf-
ficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.” Id. 
§ 230(b)(5). 
 118 Emma Grey Ellis, Facebook’s New Plan May Curb Revenge Porn, but 
Won’t Kill It, WIRED (Apr. 6, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/
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the gap in the law forcing many NCP victims to live with the fact 
that their non-consensual sexually explicit images will remain 
online was arguably created by the expansion of Section 230’s im-
munity, which resulted in online entities receiving more favorable 
legal treatment than offline entities.119 
2. PROFESSOR MARY ANNE FRANKS’ MODEL STATE LAW 
Mary Anne Franks, a Professor of Law at the University of Mi-
ami School of Law and a prominent figure in NCP law, drafted a 
model state law that aims to address the shortcomings of currently 
enacted state laws and fill the gaps present in other causes of action 
to which NCP victims are forced to resort.120 The suggested state 
law provides that “[a] person may not knowingly disclose an image 
of another, identifiable person whose intimate parts are exposed or 
who is engaged in a sexual act with knowledge of or reckless disre-
gard for the fact that the person depicted did not consent to such 
disclosure.”121 
Professor Franks’ proposal is lauded as a narrow law, fit to face 
potential First Amendment challenges.122 But critics take issue with 
some of the terminology, including the use of “identifiable person,” 
reasoning the term itself is vague, and arguing that there is no evi-
dence a person “has to be identifiable . . . to experience severe emo-
tional distress from the non-consensual distribution of a private, sex-
ual image.”123 Notwithstanding the praise and critiques, Franks’ 
model state law faces the same jurisdictional limitation plaguing all 
state-enacted NCP laws. 
                                                                                                             
facebook-revenge-porn/; accord John Oliver, supra note 106, at 13:10. See gen-
erally Jarvis, supra note 9. 
 119 Stokes, supra note 38, at 934. 
 120 See Driscoll, supra note 5, at 108. 
 121 Mary Anne Franks, CCRI Model State Law, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS 
INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/model-state-law/ (last visited Mar. 
21, 2018) [hereinafter CCRI Model State Law] (definitions, exceptions, and sev-
erability sections omitted). 
 122 See Driscoll, supra note 5, at 108. 
 123 Id. at 109 (footnote omitted). 
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3. FEDERAL CRIMINALIZATION 
The federalization of anti-NCP legislation has been gaining trac-
tion, with several countries enacting federal laws against the con-
duct, and anti-NCP advocates fighting for similar enactments in the 
United States. In addition to a model state law, Professor Franks 
drafted a model federal law against NCP that reads as follows: 
Whoever knowingly uses the mail, any interactive 
computer service, electronic communication service, 
electronic communication system of interstate com-
merce, or any other facility of interstate or foreign 
commerce to distribute a visual depiction of a person 
who is identifiable from the image itself or infor-
mation displayed in connection with the image and 
who is engaging in sexually explicit conduct, or 
whose naked genitals or post-pubescent female nip-
ple are exposed, with knowledge of or reckless dis-
regard for the fact that the depicted person did not 
consent to the distribution, shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than __ years, or both.124 
Federal criminalization of NCP is an attractive option because it 
relieves victims of the burden of funding civil litigation by shifting 
the burden to the government, and escapes Section 230 immunity, 
thus allowing victims the opportunity to go directly after the ISPs 
and websites hosting the NCP content.125 Labelling NCP a crime is 
arguably “the most accurate and principled characterization of its 
harm” because even though NCP may also be considered a violation 
of privacy or, in some cases, a copyright infringement, at its core it 
is an act of sexual use of an individual without consent.126 Federal 
criminalization is considered the best way for law enforcement to 
                                                                                                             
 124 Mary Anne Franks, CCRI Model Federal Law, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS 
INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/ccri-model-federal-law/ (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2018) (exceptions, telecommunication and ISPs, definitions, and sever-
ability sections omitted). 
 125 See Stokes, supra note 38, at 940–42. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) 
(2012). 
 126 Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3 (arguing that conduct 
does not have to involve physical contact or proximity to be considered harmful, 
e.g. child pornography). 
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protect victims because the imposition of criminal penalties on the 
creation and distribution of the material can effectively “dry up the 
[NCP] market.”127 Moreover, state laws, while important, have lim-
ited jurisdiction and are unfit to fully appreciate the interstate reali-
ties of this conduct.128 Despite these benefits, those opposed to the 
enactment of federal anti-NCP legislation maintain that NCP can be 
deterred and punished effectively with existing civil and criminal 
laws and causes of action.129 
Professor Franks’ model federal law is an example of a time, 
place, and manner restriction on NCP, as opposed to a content re-
striction.130 Adrienne Kitchen provides an additional example of this 
kind of restriction: 
Given the physical and psychological dangers to the 
subject, an actor is prohibited from posting a nude or 
sexually explicit image of another on a website de-
signed to harass, demean, or cause professional, psy-
chological or emotional harm to the victim. The fact 
a poster claims he posted the images as a joke alone 
shall not constitute a defense, particularly when then 
defendant knew or should have known the act could 
lead to harassment or harm to the victim.131 
Time, place, and manner restrictions have generally been upheld 
by courts when they “restrict conduct such as ‘harassment’ or ‘stalk-
ing.’”132 Specifically restricting the manner in which NCP is shared 
arguably prevents the law from being overly broad.133 Conse-
quently, time, place, and manner restrictions, at least as expressed 
in Kitchen’s example, can be under-inclusive. By failing to account 
                                                                                                             
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Stokes, supra note 38, at 947. 
 130 Adrienne N. Kitchen, The Need to Criminalize Revenge Porn: How a Law 
Protecting Victims Can Avoid Running Afoul to the First Amendment, 90 CHI-
KENT L. REV 247, 286 (2015). 
 131 Id. at 288. 
 132 Id. at 286. 
 133 Id. at 288. 
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for NCP that is not posted on websites “designed to harass, de-
mean,” etc.,134 perpetrators could easily escape the bounds of 
Kitchen’s example. Even if an alternative manner restriction would 
include these additional methods of dissemination, as long as tech-
nology continues to advance, and perpetrators become more crea-
tive, the law will essentially be playing “catch-up.” 
4. “INTERNET EXCEPTIONALISM” 
“Internet exceptionalism” is used to address the proposal and en-
actment of Internet-specific laws, based on the Internet’s perceived 
novelty, that differ from precedent in other types of media.135 Alter-
natively, “Internet exceptionalism” is described as an attempt to 
transform the Internet into its own jurisdiction.136 All of the above-
mentioned proposed laws against NCP fall into this category and are 
sometimes characterized as “regulatory panic.”137 Additional exam-
ples of “Internet exceptionalist” proposals include: (1) amending the 
Copyright Act to allow those who did not “author” the images of 
themselves to still be able to sue under copyright, a concept some-
times referred to as “joint authorship”;138 and (2) changing the way 
courts view NCP by establishing an implied contract of confidenti-
ality between parties who share intimate images and videos with 
each other, and an implied “right to be forgotten” upon the conclu-
sion of the relationship.139 Critics of the “Internet exceptionalist” 
approach suggest lawmakers and NCP advocates adhere to and use 
the remedies and avenues the law already provides to avoid clutter-
ing the legal system and complicating the law.140 Importantly, all of 
the above-mentioned proposals for new and amended laws run the 
risk of offending the First Amendment because, as free speech ad-
vocates indicate, “[c]onsensually recorded intimate [content] does 
not seem to fit within the categories of unprotected speech.”141 
                                                                                                             
 134 For example, NCP that is instead disseminated through e-mail, posted on 
websites such as Facebook, or printed and physically mailed or shared. 
 135 Stokes, supra note 38, at 946. 
 136 Id. at 930. 
 137 Id. at 932, 947, 950–51. 
 138 Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3; Stokes, supra note 
38, at 937. 
 139 Stokes, supra note 38, at 938. 
 140 Id. at 947. 
 141 Id. at 944. 
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III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: SHIELD OR WEAPON? 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states, 
in relevant part, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-
dom of speech.”142 This protection encompasses an individual’s 
right to freedom of expression through various mediums, but is not 
absolute, and does not protect all forms of speech.143 The Supreme 
Court has recognized categories of speech that are not protected by 
the First Amendment, including obscenity, perjury, blackmail, child 
pornography, and speech tantamount to “fighting words” or “true 
threats.”144 In Spence v. Washington, the Supreme Court stated that 
nonverbal action may qualify as speech, dependent on the context in 
which the conduct is performed and the actor’s intent to communi-
cate a particularized message that would be understood by those 
who observe it.145 The conduct of disclosing and publishing NCP is 
considered speech because it “is a communicative, symbolic act that 
expresses an idea”; this is evident considering the context of the 
posting, especially when the explicit material is posted on a website 
dedicated to NCP.146 
A. Non-consensual Pornography and the First Amendment 
1. COMBATING NON-CONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY 
LEGISLATION 
Courts employ different levels of analysis when reviewing First 
Amendment claims, depending on whether the restriction is related 
                                                                                                             
 142 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 143 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 84; see Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 
622, 642 (1951), abrogated on other grounds by Schaumburg v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (noting that not all types and forms of speech 
are protected by the First Amendment); see also Stokes, supra note 38, at 948 
(noting NCP “is objectionable to society for reasons that are not Internet-specific, 
but instead grounded in . . . moral instincts”). 
 144 KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-815, FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH AND PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1–5 (2014); accord 
First Amendment FAQ, NEWSEUM INST., http://www.newseuminstitute.org/first-
amendment-center/first-amendment-faq/#speech (last visited Dec. 6, 2017). 
 145 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
 146 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 85. 
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to the message expressed by the speech being regulated.147 In deter-
mining whether a regulation is content-based or content-neutral, 
courts ask whether the legislation favors one type of speech by bur-
dening a different type of speech because of the message being con-
veyed.148 Content-based laws disfavor speech based on the message 
expressed therein, while content-neutral laws regulate speech with 
no consideration for the views or ideas expressed (e.g., time, place, 
and manner restrictions).149 Some NCP laws are considered content-
based because they seek to prohibit a type, or subset, of pornography 
based on the views or ideas expressed by the content, essentially 
favoring other forms of pornography (i.e., consensual pornography) 
over NCP.150 Content-based restrictions on speech are reviewed un-
der strict scrutiny, while content-neutral regulations are reviewed 
under intermediate scrutiny.151 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the 
government, whether state or federal, must prove that: (1) it has a 
compelling interest in enacting the regulation, and (2) the regulation 
is narrowly tailored to address the compelling governmental inter-
est.152 
Some state NCP laws have been challenged as unconstitutional 
for allegedly infringing on First Amendment speech rights and for 
failing to meet the strict scrutiny standard due to over-inclusive and 
exceptionally broad language.153 For example, Delaware’s NCP 
law’s definition of “nudity,” which includes “buttocks,” has been 
critiqued as overbroad.154 Professor Franks’ model state law155 is 
praised for suggesting a narrow definition of “intimate parts,” in-
cluding “the naked genitals, pubic area, anus, or female post-pubes-
cent nipple of the person.”156 The model state law is further lauded 
                                                                                                             
 147 Id. at 95. 
 148 Id.; RUANE, supra note 144, at 5. 
 149 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 95; RUANE, supra note 144, at 9. 
 150 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 96. 
 151 Id. at 95–96; RUANE, supra note 144, at 9. 
 152 The courts have found general health, morality, and welfare to be compel-
ling governmental interests. Driscoll, supra note 5, at 96–97. 
 153 Id. at 97–107. 
 154 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 1335(a)(9)(a)(1) (2017); accord Driscoll, supra 
note 5, at 98. 
 155 See supra Section II.D.2. 
 156 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 108; CCRI Model State Law, supra note 121. 
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for including two exceptions, excluding from liability those who dis-
close or publish NCP content “involving voluntary exposure in pub-
lic or commercial settings,” and “[d]isclosures made in the public 
interest.”157 But critics take issue with the model state law’s specifi-
cation of an “identifiable person” and its failure to include an intent 
to cause harm requirement.158 
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) strongly ob-
jected to California’s proposed NCP law because it did not include 
an intent to cause harm requirement, and thus could hold liable in-
dividuals with legal possession of another’s image or videos.159 The 
California legislators subsequently amended the bill to include this 
language.160 The resulting final version of California’s bill is cele-
brated by some as preserving freedom of speech protections while 
focusing on the concerns of NCP victims, yet is also criticized for 
not adequately protecting the right to privacy.161 
According to Lee Rowland, an attorney with the ACLU’s 
Speech, Privacy, and Technology project, 
any legislation that hopes to withstand strict scrutiny 
must include four elements—(1) the legislation must 
require malicious intent; (2) the distribution of the 
image must cause actual harm to the victim; (3) the 
distributor of the image must act knowingly without 
the consent of the victim; and (4) the victim had a 
reasonable expectation that the image would be kept 
private.162 
                                                                                                             
 157 Drafting an Effective ‘Revenge Porn’ Law, supra note 6, at 9; accord Dris-
coll, supra note 5, at 108. 
 158 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 108–09, 109 n. 173 (explaining that not all NCP 
content is posted with identifiable information and victims may experience severe 
emotional distress based on mere knowledge of the fact their images are being 
displayed in pornography websites without their consent, and noting that the use 
of “identifiable person” in the model law leads to ambiguity “as to who must be 
able to identify the subject of [NCP]”). 
 159 Id. at 100. 
 160 Id. at 101; CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (West 2017) (the law now requires 
that “the person distributing the image knows or should know that distribution of 
the image will cause serious emotional distress”). 
 161 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 107. 
 162 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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Given that strict scrutiny analysis is notoriously difficult to sat-
isfy, with courts tending to err on the side of caution to preserve 
freedom of expression, these elements pose an additional hurdle in 
reconciling anti-NCP legislation with the First Amendment.163 Not-
withstanding these challenges, advocates argue NCP can survive 
First Amendment defenses, including strict scrutiny analysis. 
2. COUNTERARGUMENTS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
OF NON-CONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY 
a. Non-Consensual Pornography Laws Can Survive Strict 
Scrutiny Analysis 
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, the Supreme Court said, “a 
sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, 
community welfare, and the development of human personality, can 
be debased and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of 
sex.”164 This reasoning supports the proposition that states have a 
compelling interest in protecting both the individuals depicted in 
NCP and the community at large from the general harm and threat 
of NCP.165 
But a compelling interest in protecting individuals and commu-
nities is not enough. In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court held 
that states have a “compelling interest in protecting children from 
the actual dangers posed by the existence of child pornography.”166 
Decades later, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme 
Court drew a line, holding that computer-generated child pornogra-
phy could not be prohibited because it does not pose an actual dan-
ger to children.167 These cases demonstrate that legislation will not 
pass the strict scrutiny analysis absent actual harm to NCP vic-
tims.168 Evidenced by studies showing that 93% of victims experi-
enced significant emotional distress because of NCP, with 51% of 
                                                                                                             
 163 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 
49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 374–75 (2014). 
 164 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973). 
 165 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 96–97. 
 166 Id. at 97; accord New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759–64 (1982). 
 167 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 97; accord Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 
535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002). 
 168 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 97. 
2018] DRAWING THE LINE 947 
 
victims claiming they experienced suicidal thoughts, NCP has a 
strong capacity to cause actual harm, and laws can easily be tailored 
to narrowly address this issue by including “intent to cause harm” 
language.169 
According to Professor Franks, however, “intent to cause harm” 
language is not necessary, and the constitutional doctrine does not 
support the ACLU’s claim that NCP laws must include a motive re-
quirement.170 Specifically, Franks emphasizes that (1) it is insuffi-
cient to invalidate a law merely because it has the potential for over-
broad application; (2) the ACLU characterized the “intent to cause 
substantial emotional distress,” “intent to harass,” and “intent to in-
timidate” elements proposed in federal stalking provisions of the Vi-
olence Against Women Act as “unconstitutionally overbroad,” and 
now insists the same language is pertinent in ensuring the constitu-
tionality of NCP laws; and (3) the constitutionality of NCP laws is 
weakened by allowing disclosures that are not intended to cause dis-
tress, while prohibiting disclosures only when such intent is present, 
because such differentiation renders NCP laws vulnerable to “objec-
tions of constitutional under-inclusiveness and viewpoint discrimi-
nation.”171 
b. Non-Consensual Pornography Should Be Categorized       
as “Obscene” 
Many NCP law advocates maintain that NCP should not be con-
sidered constitutionally protected speech because NCP should be 
categorized as “obscene” material.172 As there is no national stand-
ard for “obscenity,” courts use the three-prong test articulated in 
                                                                                                             
 169 Drafting an Effective ‘Revenge Porn’ Law, supra note 6, at 10–14 (noting 
that 82% of victims said they “suffered significant impairment in social, occupa-
tional, or other important areas of functioning” and 42% of victims “sought out 
psychological services”); Driscoll, supra note 5, at 97 (highlighting the im-
portance of the “intent to cause harm” element). It should be noted that making 
“intent to cause harm” to the victim an element of the crime will require the victim 
to prove he or she has been harmed—in practice, this will entail testifying about 
intensely private and possibly humiliating details. 
 170 Drafting an Effective ‘Revenge Porn’ Law, supra note 6, at 6–7. 
 171 Id. at 7. 
 172 See Genn, supra note 63, at 176–85; Stokes, supra note 38, at 944–46; 
Driscoll, supra note 5, at 86–94. 
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Miller v. California to evaluate whether material is legally “ob-
scene” by reference to local community standards.173 The Miller ob-
scenity test is confined to materials involving sexual conduct, but 
the mere presence of consensual and artistic nudity does not trans-
form sexually graphic material into “obscene” material, and the 
Court has held that sexual expression is not inherently obscene, even 
if considered indecent or offensive by some.174 The three prongs 
used to determine whether content is considered obscene, as out-
lined in Miller, are as follow: 
(a) whether the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards would find that the work, 
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, . . . 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a pa-
tently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically de-
fined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the 
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.175 
Although courts have held that the government cannot punish 
possession of obscene content alone, it can “ban public distribution 
of such material.”176 In Miller, the appellant conducted an unsolic-
ited mass mailing campaign to advertise sexually explicit mate-
rial.177 The Supreme Court held that the brochures mailed—which 
featured images of men and women engaged in sexual activities—
constituted obscenity, thus allowing the state to regulate their dis-
semination without infringing on the First Amendment.178 
Those who oppose the categorization of NCP as “obscene” ar-
gue that the Supreme Court in Miller concentrated on the content of 
the sexually graphic material and gave no indication that obscenity 
                                                                                                             
 173 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 87–88; see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–
25, 30–38 (1973). 
 174 Genn, supra note 63, at 167–68; Stokes, supra note 38, at 945. See gener-
ally Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 175 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24–26 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 
accord Stokes, supra note 38, at 944–45. 
 176 Genn, supra note 63, at 168. 
 177 Miller, 413 U.S. at 16–18. 
 178 Id. at 30–37. 
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is determined by distribution.179 Critics have further argued that 
NCP cannot be categorized as “obscene” because it does not satisfy 
the three-part Miller test.180 More specifically: (1) NCP “does not 
categorically appeal to the prurient interest” because most of NCP 
does not depict sexual conduct, but mere nudity, and the court in 
Miller stated “that mere nudity did not constitute obscenity”;181 (2) 
NCP “is not, in itself, patently offensive,” and “[a]n image posted as 
[NCP] that consists of mere nudity . . . is not more offensive than 
any other form of accepted nudity”;182 and (3) “[NCP] [m]ay [h]ave 
[l]iterary or [p]olitical [v]alue” because an individual’s intimate and 
sexual history and experiences are part of that individual’s story, one 
he or she may wish to share.183 
Those who advocate for the categorization of NCP as “obscene” 
counter these objections as follows: (1) “content, context, and cir-
cumstances are all relevant in determining whether a work tends to 
excite lustful thoughts in the viewers; as such, [NCP]’s depiction” 
of an individual in the nude “or in a sexually suggestive position 
should be viewed with its original purposeful intent in mind: to 
arouse the recipient at the time it was sent”;184 (2) NCP as a whole 
represents more than mere nudity or pornography and can poten-
tially offend the average person because it attempts to diminish the 
individual featured and subject him or her to unauthorized sexual 
objectification, and, as in Miller, the material is sometimes sent to 
unwilling recipients, such as the victim’s friends, family, and 
coworkers;185 and (3) unlike depictions of nudity and sexual conduct 
found in art “as part of a larger display,” NCP is disclosed and 
shared with malicious intent, aimed at hurting the individual de-
picted, which essentially “nullifies any potential artistic or literary 
                                                                                                             
 179 See Stokes, supra note 38, at 945 (emphasizing that the court has not “held 
that transmission of material, such as the act of uploading pornography to a web-
site, can render material obscene if it is not otherwise so under relevant state law”). 
 180 Driscoll, supra note 5, at 88–94. 
 181 Id. at 88–89. 
 182 Id. at 89–90 (footnote omitted). 
 183 Id. at 91–92. 
 184 Genn, supra note 63, at 177–78 (emphasizing that NCP moves beyond 
mere nudity because sexually graphic material posted with malicious intent nar-
rows the observer’s view to the sexual aspects of the content to embarrass or har-
ass the depicted person). 
 185 Id. at 177–81. 
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value.”186 Additionally, an unauthorized publication of an individual 
in the nude or engaged in sexually explicit activity constitutes a 
shameful interest in sexual conduct that exceeds society’s custom-
ary limits of pornographic material.187 
All speech is not equal under the First Amendment.188 While 
some private matters are protected by the First Amendment, the Su-
preme Court has emphasized that matters concerning the public at 
large are at the core of the First Amendment’s protection.189 NCP 
law advocates urge that while some private matters may be protected 
by the First Amendment, there should be a compelling interest in the 
publication and disclosure of NCP.190 Others recommend that “the 
law should distinguish between images that are meant to be public—
protest art, for instance, which should get the highest First Amend-
ment protection—and those that are meant to be private, like nude 
pictures.”191 
B. Art and the Law 
The United States government seldom polices art based on its 
content.192 When the government regulates art, it does so through 
content-neutral restrictions that encompass many activities, and 
therefore do not violate, and rarely trigger, the First Amendment.193 
Child pornography laws vary from state to state, but the federal law 
against child pornography includes “any visual depiction of sexually 
explicit conduct involving a minor.”194 This definition does not re-
                                                                                                             
 186 Id. at 183 n.120, 183–84; see Combating NCP, supra note 1, at 16 (“The 
First Amendment does not serve as a blanket protection for malicious, harmful 
conduct simply because such conduct may have an expressive dimension.”). 
 187 Genn, supra note 63, at 180. 
 188 Combating NCP, supra note 1, at 15, 15 n.36. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 15–16. 
 191 Somini Sengupta, ‘Revenge Porn’ Could Be Criminal Offense in Califor-
nia, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Aug. 27, 2013, 8:18 AM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/
2013/08/27/revenge-porn-could-be-criminal-offense-in-california/?_r=0 (state-
ment of Professor Danielle Citron at the University of Maryland); accord Citron 
& Franks, supra note 163, at 383–84. 
 192 Tushnet, supra note 18, at 174. 
 193 Id. at 174, 184. 
 194 Citizen’s Guide to U.S. Federal Law on Child Pornography, U.S. DEP’T. 
OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/citizens-guide-us-federal-law-
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quire that the minor be engaged in sexual activity, and the Depart-
ment of Justice emphasizes that “[a] picture of a naked child may 
constitute illegal child pornography if it is sufficiently sexually sug-
gestive.”195 
Acclaimed photographer Jock Sturges’ oeuvre focuses on the 
members of “naturist” communities and their children.196 Most of 
Sturges’ work features young women and girls in the nude, includ-
ing models as young as four years old.197 In 1990, Sturges’ equip-
ment and photographs of unclothed pre-pubescent girls on a nude 
beach in France were confiscated after his San Francisco studio was 
raided by the FBI and the San Francisco Police Department pursuant 
to child pornography charges.198 After much time and roughly 
$100,000 in legal fees, Sturges avoided indictment by a federal 
grand jury.199 
In 1992, photographer Sally Mann published a book of photo-
graphs titled “Immediate Family.”200 The book’s introduction con-
tained four photographs of phallic sculptures made by Mann’s father 
that decorated Mann’s childhood home.201 These photographs were 
meant to show the peculiarities of the Mann family, but also added, 
perhaps unintentionally, “an explicitly sexual element to the frame 
of the project.”202 “Immediate Family” consists of sixty photographs 
chronicling the growth of Mann’s three children—Emmett, Jessie, 
                                                                                                             
child-pornography (last updated Dec. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Citizen’s Guide]. See 
generally 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2012). 
 195 Citizen’s Guide, supra note 194. 
 196 Sarah Parsons, Public/Private Tensions in the Photography of Sally Mann, 
32 HIST. OF PHOTOGRAPHY 123, 132 n.26 (2008). 
 197 Ana Moriarty, Nudes in the Jock Sturges Photos – On the Verge of Taboo, 
WIDEWALLS (Dec. 14, 2017), http://www.widewalls.ch/jock-sturges-photos/. 
 198 Parsons, supra note 196, at 132 n.26; Richard B. Woodward, The Disturb-
ing Photography of Sally Mann, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 27, 1992), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/27/magazine/the-disturbing-photography-of-
sally-mann.html?pagewanted=all; Sally Mann, Sally Mann’s Exposure, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (April 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/magazine/
the-cost-of-sally-manns-exposure.html. 
 199 Doreen Carvajal, Pornography Meets Paranoia, N.Y. TIMES: THE NATION 
(Feb. 19, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/19/weekinreview/the-nation-
pornography-meets-paranoia.html. 
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 201 Parsons, supra note 196, at 126. 
 202 Id. 
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and Virginia—for over a decade, who were about six, four, and one, 
respectively, at the start of the project.203 The photographs featured 
Mann’s children in the nude, dirty from playing outdoors, flirtatious, 
and bruised and bloodied after sustaining injuries.204 The publica-
tion of “Immediate Family” propelled Mann to success, with her 
printing of the series selling out in three months.205 Unsurprisingly, 
this success came at a price. The depictions of Mann’s children in 
the nude were problematic for many publications.206 The Wall Street 
Journal censored a nude photograph of Virginia (then four years 
old) with black bars covering her eyes, chest, and genitals;207 and 
one of the most traditionally radical New York magazines at the 
time, Artforum, refused to run a photograph of Jessie swinging on a 
hay hook in the nude.208 
Mann was warned by a federal prosecutor in Virginia, from 
whom she sought advice prior to publication, that distribution of 
some of the photographs could lead to her arrest.209 But unlike the 
Sturges case, the FBI neither raided Mann’s studio nor confiscated 
her photographs and equipment; in fact, Mann was spared the litiga-
tion surrounding other photographers who have featured nude mi-
nors in their work.210 Yet, Mann’s collection was not sheltered from 
controversy and harsh criticism. In an article Mann wrote for the 
New York Times, she discussed the various letters she received after 
her work was released.211 According to Mann, these letters ranged 
from the supportive to the critical, and even the creepy.212 The gen-
                                                                                                             
 203 Mann, supra note 198. 
 204 Parsons, supra note 196, at 124. 
 205 See Mann, supra note 198; Woodward, supra note 198. 
 206 See Woodward, supra note 198. 
 207 Id.; Mann, supra note 198 (Mann recalling Virginia did not like this cen-
sorship, and the black bars placed over her body made Virginia feel uncomfortable 
in her skin for the first time. In response, Virginia sent the Wall Street Journal a 
letter expressing her disappointment. Mann herself saw the censorship of Vir-
ginia’s photograph as a disfigurement that made it appear “as if it were Exhibit A 
in a child pornography prosecution”). 
 208 See Woodward, supra note 198. 
 209 See Parsons, supra note 196, at 126; Woodward, supra note 198. 
 210 See Woodward, supra note 198. 
 211 Mann, supra note 198. 
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eral negative reception of the photographs concentrated on the sub-
jects being children photographed by their mother, with many ac-
cusing Mann of sexualizing her children.213 Kiku Adatto, who 
served as director of Children’s Studies at Harvard, critiqued Mann 
for photographing “her own young children nude in erotic poses, or 
posed as victims of abuse and incest.”214 In a review of Mann’s col-
lection, British writer Nicci Gerrard described the photographs as 
“all disturbing and confrontational,” taking specific issue with a 
photograph titled Wet Bed, which she notes makes Virginia, the 
model in the photograph, appear as though she were “a prostitute, 
with her lover just departed not like a little girl, fast asleep, who has 
just wet her bed.”215 Others saw past the alleged sexual connotation 
of the photographs, with one critic, who emphasized her own role as 
a mother, saying of Wet Bed, “I could come up with a hundred as-
sociations before arriving at prostitute, but I marvel at Mann’s abil-
ity to make Virginia look absolutely beautiful lying in a pee pud-
dle.”216 In describing the photographs that featured her children in 
the nude, Mann said, “[w]hen I saw their bodies and photographed 
them, I never thought of them as being sexual; I thought of them as 
being simply, miraculously and sensuously beautiful.”217 
For Mann, hiring professional models was not an option in cre-
ating “Immediate Family,” because the collection “is not just 
about . . . childhood” and the experience of growing up, “it is also 
about motherhood.”218 Mann maintained she photographed and pub-
lished the pictures of her children with their full support and con-
sent.219 Before publication, Mann gave each child the pictures of 
themselves and asked them to remove those they did not want pub-
lished.220 Surprisingly, the children did not care that the photographs 
featured them in the nude; indeed, they removed only photographs 
                                                                                                             
 213 Parsons, supra note 196, at 123–24. 
 214 Id. at 127. See generally HARV. UNIV., Kiku Adatto, COMMITTEE ON 
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they felt made them look like “dorks.”221 Mann even considered not 
publishing the photographs until her children were much older, but 
her children insisted that she not wait.222 The oldest two children, 
Emmett and Jessie, were then sent to a psychologist to verify they 
understood the implications of the photographs and their publica-
tion.223 In contrast to Sturges’ work, perhaps the fact that Mann’s 
subjects and muses were her children carries a greater appearance of 
consent and diminishes a sexual tie between model and photogra-
pher, at least enough to keep child pornography charges at bay.224 
In the wake of child pornography attacks and allegations sur-
rounding the publication of “Immediate Family,” Mann found sup-
port among artists and lawyers. Sarah Parsons, Associate Professor 
at the Department of Visual Art in York University, described the 
photographs as challenging the public and the private, and stated 
that “when child pornography displays real abuses against children, 
it is clearly criminal, but vague laws that might encompass works 
like Mann’s endanger freedom of expression.”225 Some art critics 
stress the photographs are not about the children’s “sexual parts,” 
but about a “deeper look into the spirit of the individual,” drawing 
attention to the idea that societal trends pertaining to sexuality 
change as society and culture do.226 The late Edward de Grazia, civil 
liberties expert and law professor at Cardozo School of Law, de-
fended Mann’s work and argued that the Supreme Court would rec-
ognize Mann’s artistic motives and value.227 Grazia stated that 
Mann’s collection is entitled to First Amendment protection, em-
phasizing that the outrage over “Immediate Family” highlights the 
vagueness and overreach of current child pornography laws.228 In 
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 222 Id.; Parsons, supra note 196, at 126. 
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defense of her work, Mann insisted she had a right to tell her story 
about family and motherhood. She quoted Oscar Wilde, asserting 
that when he was condemned “in a similar ad hominem way, [he] 
insisted that it is senseless to speak of morality when discussing art, 
asserting that the hypocritical, prudish and philistine English public, 
when unable to find the art in a work of art, instead looked for the 
man in it.”229 
IV. “I MADE THAT B**** FAMOUS” 
A. Kanye West’s Famous Music Video 
1. MUSIC VIDEO DESCRIPTION, PRODUCTION, AND 
INSPIRATION 
In June 2016, American rapper Kanye West premiered the music 
video for his song Famous230 from his seventh studio album “The 
Life of Pablo.”231 The music video premiered at a viewing party at 
Forum, an arena located in Inglewood, California.232 
West’s Famous music video begins with a grainy image of a 
pink sky, followed by a compilation of fast moving images, while 
audio of West’s 2013 interview with Zane Lowe from BBC Radio 1 
is heard, in which West states, “[w]e culture. Rap is the new rock 
‘n’ roll. We the rock stars . . . [i]t’s been like that for a minute, Hedi 
Slimane!”233 A zoomed camera begins to panel over naked bodies—
close enough so viewers can make out only one body part at a 
time.234 The song Famous by Kanye West begins to play as the only 
image on the screen is that of silky white bed sheets, scrunched up 
                                                                                                             
 229 Mann, supra note 198; Parsons, supra note 196, at 129. 
 230 See generally KanyeWestVEVO, Kanye West – Famous, YOUTUBE (July 
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as if they had just been used.235 The focus shifts to show some of the 
faces (and at times breasts) of those featured in the video, who can 
all be described as “major cultural icons,” lying on a bed together, 
seemingly asleep.236 The footage has a voyeuristic and amateur feel 
to it as the camera haphazardly scans over the nude bodies on the 
bed.237 At the 1:40 minute mark, the focus is completely on a pair of 
breasts as artist Rihanna sings the song’s hook.238 It now becomes 
clear who is featured on the bed. In order of display are President 
George W. Bush,239 Anna Wintour,240 President Donald Trump,241 
Rihanna,242 Chris Brown,243 Taylor Swift,244 Kanye West,245 Kim 
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Year Donald Trump, TIME, http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2016-don-
ald-trump/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2017). 
 242 Musician who sings the hook in Kanye West’s Famous music video. See 
Bio, RIHANNA, http://www.rihannanow.com/bio/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2017); 
WEST, supra note 231. 
 243 Musician. Chris Brown, BIOGRAPHY, https://www.biography.com/peo-
ple/chris-brown-265946 (last visited Dec. 6, 2017). 
 244 Musician. Taylor Swift, BIOGRAPHY, https://www.biography.com/peo-
ple/taylor-swift-369608 (last visited Dec. 6, 2017). 
 245 Fashion designer and rapper. Zara, supra note 14. 
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Kardashian West,246 Ray J,247 Amber Rose,248 Caitlyn Jenner,249 and 
Bill Cosby.250 The music stops playing at the 2:39 minute mark, and 
for the following four minutes the viewer can only hear and see the 
nude bodies breathing and snoring.251 
Around the 6:38 minute mark, the screen cuts to black and the 
words “SPECIAL THANKS” appear, followed by “BILL COSBY” 
“CAITLYN JENNER” “AMBER ROSE” “RAY J” “KIM 
KARDASHIAN WEST” “TAYLOR SWIFT” “CHRIS BROWN” 
“RIHANNA” “DONALD TRUMP” “ANNA WINTOUR” 
“GEORGE W. BUSH” “FOR BEING FAMOUS.”252 The music re-
starts at the 7:25 minute mark, as the camera zooms and focuses on 
Kanye West and his wife, Kim Kardashian West, on the bed.253 The 
camera slowly zooms out, adding two more individuals into the 
frame at a time, until the audience has a full view of the bed, with 
all those depicted in the frame.254 The footage is now clear and the 
image resembles Vincent Desiderio’s painting Sleep.255 In the last 
                                                                                                             
 246 Television personality, businesswoman, and wife of Kanye West. Natalie 
Robehmed, Kim Kardashian West, Mobile Mogul: The Forbes Cover Story, 
FORBES (July 11, 2016, 9:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/
2016/07/11/kim-kardashian-mobile-mogul-the-forbes-cover-
story/#3a6e42a77aea. 
 247 Musician. Ray J: Artist Biography of Bradley Torreano, ALLMUSIC, 
http://www.allmusic.com/artist/ray-j-mn0000405142/biography (last visited Dec. 
6, 2017). 
 248 Model and activist. See Soraya Nadia McDonald, The Complicated Femi-
nism of Amber Rose’s SlutWalk, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2015/10/05/the-complicated-
feminism-of-amber-roses-slutwalk/?utm_term=.d36c02d0f008. 
 249 1976 Olympic gold medalist, television personality, and former step-father 
of Kim Kardashian West (formerly known as Bruce Jenner). See Katy Steinmetz, 
Person of the Year: The Short List No. 7 Caitlyn Jenner, TIME, http://time.com/
time-person-of-the-year-2015-runner-up-caitlyn-jenner/ (last visited Dec. 6, 
2017); Buzz Bissinger, Caitlyn Jenner: The Full Story, VANITY FAIR (June 25, 
2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2015/06/caitlyn-jenner-
bruce-cover-annie-leibovitz. 
 250 Former comedian, actor, and producer. See Bill Cosby Fast Facts, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/24/us/bill-cosby-fast-facts/ (last updated Feb. 28, 
2018, 5:15 PM). 
 251 Famous, supra note 230, at 2:39. 
 252 Id. at 6:38. 
 253 Id. at 7:25. 
 254 Id. at 7:27. 
 255 Id. at 8:35. 
958 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:920 
 
couple of seconds, West, lying on the bed, turns his head and looks 
to the camera.256 
For the creation of the Famous music video, West instructed his 
team at DONDA, a “Content, Experience, [and] Product Company,” 
to produce “anatomically correct representations” of each individ-
ual.257 The team charged with the project meticulously researched 
those who would be depicted in the music video.258 To adequately 
capture every small detail, West’s DONDA team examined thou-
sands of photographs and spoke with celebrity stylists.259 The final 
piece was produced using animation, scanning, 3-D software, and 
hand-sculpting—each strand of hair applied individually.260 This 
feat proved successful, with the final product leaving many viewers 
to wonder which celebrities featured were playing themselves and 
which were prosthetic replicas.261 The video, filmed over three 
months, was inspired by artist Vincent Desiderio’s painting titled 
Sleep, which similarly features a row of nude, but unknown, indi-
viduals tangled in white sheets, lying side by side.262 According to 
West, the music video is not intended to be sexual, and he and his 
team were very careful not to include any sexually charged footage 
of the replicas.263 Additionally, West has expressed the music video 
is not meant to show support or negativity towards any of those de-
picted, but is instead meant to be “a comment on fame.”264 In August 
2016, West displayed the sculpture(s) at an exclusive two-day art 
exhibition at the Los Angeles gallery Blum & Poe.265 The piece has 
been described as “extraordinarily lifelike” and “eerily convinc-
ing.”266 
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2. RECEPTION267 
a. The Individuals Depicted 
After the Famous music video premiered, a representative for 
President George W. Bush told Billboard magazine that President 
Bush did not participate in the video, adding that he is in “much 
better shape” than depicted.268 President Donald Trump’s repre-
sentative denied Trump’s involvement in the production.269 Chris 
Brown demonstrated his approval for the music video in the caption 
of an Instagram post.270 Kim Kardashian West consented to the use 
of her likeness for the music video and even took part in the creation 
of her anatomical replica.271 Ray J was confronted by reporters from 
the celebrity news outlet TMZ in downtown Los Angeles after the 
video’s release.272 In the videotaped encounter, Ray J is asked his 
                                                                                                             
 267 Because the Famous video involved celebrities, most of the information 
regarding their reactions was reported by tabloid magazines. Therefore, the con-
tent in this Section should be considered in the context of sensational tabloid 
news. 
 268 Gil Kaufman, George W. Bush Responds to Kanye West’s ‘Famous’ Video: 
I’m in ‘Much Better Shape,’ BILLBOARD (June 27, 2016), https://www.bill-
board.com/articles/news/7416672/george-w-bush-naked-kanye-west-famous-
video. 
 269 Kanye’s ‘Famous’ Video Features Nude Donald Trump, Taylor Swift and 
Caitlyn Jenner, VARIETY (June 24, 2016, 9:41 PM), http://variety.com/2016/mu-
sic/news/kanyes-famous-video-features-nude-donald-trump-taylor-swift-and-
caitlyn-jenner-1201803563/. 
 270 Mitchell Peters, Chris Brown Responds to Kanye West’s Provocative ‘Fa-
mous’ Video, BILLBOARD (June 25, 2016), http://www.billboard.com/articles/col-
umns/hip-hop/7416565/chris-brown-responds-to-kanye-west-provocative-fa-
mous-video. Instagram is a mobile phone application and website that allows us-
ers to post photographs and videos to share either privately or publicly. Elise Mo-
reau, What Is Instagram, Anyway?, LIFEWIRE (last updated Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-instagram-3486316. 
 271 Standen, supra note 13; Spencer Kornhaber, Kanye West’s ‘Famous’ Inde-
cency, ATLANTIC (June 27, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/ar-
chive/2016/06/kanye-wests-famous-indecency-taylor-swift/488978/; Zara, supra 
note 14. 
 272 Ray J Manager’s Pissed at Kanye ‘WATCH YOUR F****** MOUTH!’, 
TMZ (June 27, 2016, 8:34 AM), http://www.tmz.com/2016/06/27/ray-j-kanye-
west-threat-wack-100/. 
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thoughts on the use of his likeness for the music video.273 Ray J re-
plied that he was not interested in discussing the matter, but his man-
ager, who goes by the name of “Wack 100,” took the opportunity to 
threaten West.274 Anna Wintour, Rihanna, Taylor Swift, Caitlyn 
Jenner, and Bill Cosby have not officially responded to the music 
video’s release. 
b. The Public 
In an interview with Vanity Fair magazine, West stated that he 
showed the music video to some of his celebrity friends who did not 
appear in it: “[g]uess what the response is when I show it to them?” 
he asked, “[t]hey want to be in the bed.”275 Tim Blum, co-founder 
of the gallery Blum & Poe, where West’s piece was exhibited, de-
scribed the piece as “extraordinary,” stating it “completely succeeds 
as a sculpture and multi-media installation.”276 Despite the praise, 
many have asked whether this can actually be considered “art.”277 
In response to the critics, Blum asserts that if this piece were created 
by someone other than West, such as a known artist, the public’s 
perception would be different—“it would be celebrated and univer-
sally supported at the highest level.”278 Acclaimed director Werner 
Herzog raved over the music video, describing it as “deceivingly 
well-cast” and possessing caliber.279 Others have criticized the piece 
as plagiarism of another artist’s work, referring to Desiderio’s paint-
ing Sleep, which itself was based on Jackson Pollock’s 1943 paint-
ing Mural.280 Despite the plagiarism accusations, Desiderio stated 
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 279 Jen Yamato, Watch: Werner Herzog Analyzes Kanye West’s ‘Famous’ Mu-
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that he admires West for attempting to work at the highest artistic 
level.281 
Unsurprisingly, the Famous music video has received consider-
able backlash. Some have described the cinematography as “voyeur-
istic” and “predatory,”282 and others have compared the music video 
to “leaked sex tapes and the violation they represent,” doubting the 
intended message of the project.283 The biggest critic thus far has 
been writer, producer, and actress Lena Dunham, who highlighted 
the untimeliness of the video’s release in regards to the now infa-
mous Brock Turner rape case and recent incidents of sexual assaults 
livestreamed on Periscope.284 Dunham, who acknowledged her 
friendship with Taylor Swift in her critique, labelled the music video 
as “sickening,” condemning it as “one of the more disturbing ‘artis-
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http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/02/us/brock-turner-release-jail/; Steve Olenski, 
What Is Periscope and How Can You Use It for Business Video Streaming?, 
FORBES (Dec. 5, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveolenski/
2015/12/05/what-is-periscope-and-how-can-you-use-it-for-business-video-
streaming/#424abe4671b8 (explaining Periscope is a service in which users can 
live-stream videos and broadcast them to the Periscope community). For use of 
Periscope in the livestream of sexual assaults, see Mike McPhate, Teenager Is 
Accused of Live-Streaming a Friend’s Rape on Periscope, N.Y. TIMES (April 18, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/19/us/periscope-rape-case-columbus-
ohio-video-livestreaming.html?_r=0. 
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tic’ efforts in recent memory,” specifically taking issue with identi-
fiable women “being reduced to a pair of waxy breasts.”285 Dunham 
ended her critique by asserting that she admires West, and urging 
him to make his statements about privacy and celebrity, but not in a 
manner that “feels informed and inspired by the aspects of our cul-
ture that make women feel unsafe even in their own beds, in their 
own bodies.”286 
The Famous music video was nominated for the “Video of the 
Year” award at the 2016 MTV Video Music Awards, but ultimately 
lost.287 During the awards ceremony, West recognized the contro-
versy surrounding the music video and reiterated that it was “an ex-
pression of our now, our fame right now . . . [w]e all came over in 
the same boat and now we all ended up in the same bed.”288 
B. Kanye West’s “Famous” Music Video and                        
Its Relation to NCP 
Kanye West’s Famous music video is featured on YouTube’s 
website with an age-restriction notice.289 YouTube’s age-restricted 
content categorization is reserved for videos that do not necessarily 
“cross the line, but still contain sexual content.”290 Factors that 
YouTube takes into consideration when categorizing a video as age-
restricted include: whether the video contains nudity as the focal 
point, such as breasts, buttocks, or genitals; “whether the video[’s] 
setting is sexually suggestive . . . , such as a bed;” and whether the 
content of the video is “educational, documentary, scientific, or ar-
tistic.”291 
Although West has been adamant that the music video is about 
fame and great care was taken to exclude sexual footage, similar to 
the effect Mann’s inclusion of photographs of phallic sculptures had 
in the introduction to “Immediate Family,” the highly publicized 
real-life sexual drama among those depicted in West’s video adds a 
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layer of sexual connotation to the work.292 For example, Kanye West 
and Kim Kardashian West are married;293 Rihanna and Chris Brown 
have reportedly been in an “on-again-off-again” relationship since 
2008;294 Amber Rose and Kanye West were in a relationship for 
about two years;295 Kim Kardashian West and Ray J were in a rela-
tionship and made a “sex tape” that is widely known and circu-
lated;296 at the time of the music video’s release, Bill Cosby was 
publicly accused of sexual assault by many women and subse-
quently faced trial for those accusations;297 and although Taylor 
Swift has not been romantically linked to any of those featured, the 
camera pans over her replica in the music video as the lyrics, “I feel 
like me and Taylor might still have sex/ Why? I made that b**** 
famous” are heard.298 Armed with this knowledge, viewers may 
very likely suspend West’s purported message and interpret the 
video as sending a different message loaded with malicious intent—
whether to embarrass the individuals depicted without their consent, 
as much NCP is intended to do, or as some sort of power display. 
As one reviewer noted, “nudity is sexual in our culture,” especially 
our popular culture.299 
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mous-video-lawsuit/. Mere nudity may be enough to be considered pornography 
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Whether the Famous music video may be considered NCP is, at 
least partially, a question of law.300 California, where the music 
video premiered and where many of those featured live, is one of 
thirty-eight states with NCP laws.301 California’s NCP law prohib-
its, in relevant part, the use of concealed recording devices of any 
type to secretly film an 
identifiable person . . . in a state of full or partial un-
dress, for the purpose of viewing the[ir] body . . . 
without the consent or knowledge of that [] person, 
in the interior of . . . any . . . area in which that [] 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, with 
the intent to invade the privacy of that [] person.302 
This law does not seem to cover the Famous music video be-
cause there was no use of a concealed recording device to capture 
the images and videos of the individuals depicted; rather, West cre-
ated anatomical replications of the individuals in the nude, or what 
West and his team believe the individuals look like in the nude, and 
filmed his replicas. Additionally, the music video was not filmed in 
the interior of an area in which those depicted have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy as required by the California law. Given these 
facts, and the applicable statutory language, it would seem an un-
substantiated stretch to apply California’s NCP law to West’s Fa-
mous music video. 
Alternatively, one can view West’s Famous music video 
through the lens of proposed anti-NCP legislation. Professor Franks’ 
model state law prohibits the knowing distribution of an image of an 
identifiable person, whether “identifiable from the image itself or 
                                                                                                             
in the NCP context because it is an attempt to diminish the individual depicted 
and subject him or her to unauthorized sexual exploitation. See supra Section 
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law does not identify a situation as NCP, even though that situation may otherwise 
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2018] DRAWING THE LINE 965 
 
information displayed in connection with the image . . . whose inti-
mate parts are exposed . . . when the actor knows that or consciously 
disregarded a substantial and unjustified risk that the depicted per-
son has not consented to such disclosure.”303 Professor Franks’ 
model federal law prohibits the knowing disclosure, through inter-
state commerce, of “an image of another, identifiable person whose 
intimate parts are exposed . . . when the actor knows or should have 
known that the depicted person has not consented to such disclo-
sure.”304 Under both proposed laws, West’s Famous music video 
may be considered unlawful NCP. The music video and the human 
replicas are images. The individuals featured are famous celebrities, 
identifiable in the video itself and by name in the credits sequence, 
whose bodies were replicated and turned into nude imitations. Ad-
ditionally, the creation of the nude sculptures using the celebrities’ 
likeness and subsequent filming was done without the consent of 
most. 
The fact that the music video was created with replications of 
identifiable individuals, not footage of the individuals themselves, 
should not diminish this characterization. In 1996, Congress passed 
the Child Pornography Prevention Act (“CPPA”), which expanded 
the federal law against child pornography to include virtual child 
pornography.305 Virtual child pornography consists of “sexually ex-
plicit images that appear to depict minors but were produced without 
using any real children.”306 Provisions of the CPPA that outlawed 
any apparent “visual depiction . . . of a minor” engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct, and any sexually explicit image that is “advertised, 
promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that 
conveys the impression it depicts a minor engaging in sexually ex-
plicit conduct” were held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court in Free Speech Coalition.307 The Court reasoned that these 
provisions prohibited a form of speech that is considered neither 
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child pornography under Ferber nor obscene under Miller.308 Nev-
ertheless, the constitutionality of Section 2256(8)(C) of the CPPA, 
which prohibits the digital “morphing” or alteration of images of 
real children “so that the children appear to be engaged in sexual 
activity,”309 was held constitutional in United States v. Hotaling.310 
Hotaling concludes that minors are harmed by image alteration be-
cause the connection between the actual minor and the sexually ex-
plicit conduct affects the actual minor’s reputation and may lead to 
psychological harm stemming from the knowledge that his or her 
image was exploited.311 Unlike child pornography, NCP has not 
been explicitly federally outlawed, but this example demonstrates a 
great potential for harm when, similar to those featured in West’s 
music video, an identifiable individual’s innocent image or likeness 
is altered to depict a sexually explicit context. 
Even if the music video escaped application of the California 
state law against NCP, that does not necessarily preclude West’s 
production from being categorized as NCP. The video could easily 
be described as the publication of sexually explicit content without 
the featured individual’s consent, and therefore falls squarely within 
the definition of NCP.312 
C. Celebrities, They’re Just Like Us!: Alternative                   
Causes of Action 
After the music video’s release, Kanye West tweeted, and then 
deleted, the following: “Can somebody sue me already #I’llwait.”313 
So, if not NCP, how can the celebrities depicted sue West?314 Simi-
lar to NCP victims who live in states without NCP laws, or with 
deficient NCP laws, the celebrities in West’s Famous music video 
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will have to resort to other areas of law,315 such as the right of pub-
licity or the Lanham Act. 
The right of publicity theory was developed to protect a celeb-
rity’s commercial interest in his or her identity, which is considered 
valuable in the promotion and endorsement of, and association with, 
products and services.316 California recognizes the statutory and 
common law right of publicity. California’s statutory right of pub-
licity prohibits any person from “knowingly us[ing] another’s name, 
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in 
products, merchandise, or goods . . . without such person’s prior 
consent.”317 The common law right of publicity is similar, but not 
identical, to its statutory counterpart. The elements of California’s 
common law claim proscribe an individual from using another per-
son’s identity, for the individual’s advantage, whether commercial 
or otherwise, without such person’s consent.318 The unauthorized 
use of another’s identity may include the use of the person’s “name, 
voice, likeness, etc.”319 
The Lanham Act is considered “the federal equivalent of a right 
of publicity claim.”320 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act states that 
any person using, “in connection with any goods or services . . . any 
false . . . or misleading description . . . or representation . . . shall be 
liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is 
or is likely to be damaged by such act.”321 At the heart of a Lanham 
Act claim lies proof of a “likelihood of confusion”;322 in other 
words, whether a consumer or viewer is likely to believe that the 
individual depicted endorsed the product or consented to the use of 
his or her image or likeness by the creator of the product.323 
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Although the common law and statutory right of publicity, as 
well as the Lanham Act, aim to protect the commercial interests of 
celebrities in their images, they are limited by the right to free ex-
pression provided by the First Amendment.324 In balancing the right 
to free expression versus a celebrity’s right of publicity, the Su-
preme Court of California developed a “transformative” test.325 In 
Comedy III Products, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., the Supreme Court 
of California held that a defendant may raise a First Amendment 
defense in the use of a celebrity’s likeness when such likeness is 
used as a form of expression, such as art, whether or not sold for 
profit, if the defendant’s work “adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the [image or likeness] with 
new expression, meaning, or message.”326 
The rationale behind this transformative test is that if a work has 
been sufficiently transformed, it “is less likely to interfere with the 
economic interests protected by the right of publicity, because a dis-
torted image . . . is a poor substitute for more conventional forms of 
celebrity depictions, and thus less likely to threaten [their] mar-
ket.”327 The transformative test asks “whether the celebrity likeness 
is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is synthe-
sized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the 
very sum and substance of the work in question.”328 If the work con-
taining the individual’s likeness is transformed to the point that it 
“has become primarily the defendant’s own expression,” rather than 
a literal recreation of the celebrity’s image, the work is protected by 
the First Amendment.329 
At first glance, unless nudity is considered “transformative,” 
West’s creation may not appear to have “transformed” the images 
of the celebrities featured; indeed, as mentioned above, West and his 
team worked to meticulously copy the physical appearances of those 
portrayed, down to the most minute details.330 We are left with not 
                                                                                                             
 324 Id. at 1401 n.3. 
 325 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799–800, 809–
10 (Cal. 2001). 
 326 Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 
(1994)); accord Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 614–15. 
 327 Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 614–15. 
 328 Comedy III Prod., Inc., 21 P.3d at 809. 
 329 Id.; Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 614–15. 
 330 Zara, supra note 14. 
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caricatures or lampoons, but exact replicas of the individuals that 
left many stumped and wondering how West persuaded such icons 
to lie in bed together.331 But one may easily counter that the images, 
taken together and in the context of the music video, were trans-
formed into a larger, albeit ironic, new message: a metaphor for 
fame and the scrutinized exploitation today’s celebrities endure.332 
Celebrities’ lives are always on display, even during their most vul-
nerable and intimate moments, and West allegedly intended to 
demonstrate the offensive, distasteful element in our society’s ob-
session with celebrity.333 
Some of the celebrities depicted were reportedly upset and 
harmed by West’s production,334 yet they have not challenged West 
and his message in court. Some hypothesize that no lawsuit has been 
filed because the piece is “undeniably genius” as a metaphor for 
fame.335 Others believe filing a lawsuit could lead to further public-
ity for the music video, essentially popularizing the very thing 
sought to be extinguished.336 Moreover, filing a lawsuit could po-
tentially lead to a grueling discovery process, as demonstrated by 
other right of publicity actions that have required the production of 
endorsement contracts and long depositions aimed at uncovering the 
true value of a celebrity’s fame.337 And perhaps the subjects are re-
luctant to sue because the court of public opinion is paramount to 
the court of law, and the public’s outcry has not been loud enough 
to warrant West’s legal condemnation.338 
West’s Famous music video does not suggest any person may 
now produce virtual NCP with the use of an identifiable individual’s 
innocent image and avoid prosecution or civil liability—even if he 
or she were to add a soundtrack to it and announce the work is in-
tended to communicate an innocent, artistic message. But the piece 
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 332 Defebaugh, supra note 293. 
 333 Id. 
 334 See supra Section IV.A.2.i. 
 335 Defebaugh, supra note 293. 
 336 Eriq Gardner, Kanye West’s ‘Famous’ Video Is Infamous, But Will Any 
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 338 This may also be why Sally Mann was not subject to the same legal treat-
ment as Jock Sturges. See supra Section III.B. 
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demonstrates the variations of NCP that current and proposed laws 
have not necessarily taken into consideration. There may very likely 
be instances where a perpetrator uses a victim’s innocent image, al-
ters it to make the victim appear as if he or she were posing or en-
gaged in sexual conduct, and distributes it for the same reasons per-
petrators distribute traditional forms of NCP.339 As discussed above, 
the use of an identifiable individual’s image in this manner has the 
potential to cause great reputational and psychological harm.340 
If a federal NCP law were enacted to prohibit the use of an iden-
tifiable individual’s innocent, non-sexual image in the creation of 
NCP, situations similar to West’s Famous music video, where the 
material may fall within the definition of NCP, features public fig-
ures, and is intended to be and is considered art by community stand-
ards, may still be protected. This could be accomplished by includ-
ing an exception, just as Franks’ model state law does, to “[d]isclo-
sures made in the public interest.”341 Similar to defamation suits that 
place a higher burden of proof on celebrities and public figures due 
to the nature of their profession, a higher burden requiring a demon-
stration of reputational or psychological harm, or evidence that the 
material does not contain a larger, artistic message, may be placed 
on morphed-image NCP claims brought by public figures.342 
V. CONCLUSION 
Like child pornography, as evidenced by controversies sur-
rounding Sturges and Mann’s oeuvres, it is difficult to create and 
enforce an NCP law that reasonably encompasses all instances in 
which one may be offended or rattled by non-consensual nude de-
pictions of individuals without offending the First Amendment right 
to freedom of expression.343 But West’s Famous music video and 
                                                                                                             
 339 Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law, supra note 3. 
 340 United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 729–30 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 341 Drafting an Effective ‘Revenge Porn’ Law, supra note 6, at 9. 
 342 See Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803–04 
(Cal. 2001) (stating, in the court’s discussion of defamation, that public figures 
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 343 See supra Part III. 
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the Supreme Court’s holding in Hotaling demonstrate the potential 
for harmful situations and variations of NCP that neither the current 
nor proposed laws have accounted for, with the rise in the use and 
advancement of technology likely worsening the situation.344 
West’s Famous music video was produced and distributed with-
out the consent of all those depicted, consequently leaving many up-
set and uneasy.345 The fact that West is sheltered by his characteri-
zation as an artist and the music video by the label of “art,” high-
lights the competing interests and rights we have as individuals. Per-
haps West’s intended message is true and those attacking the pro-
duction, in the words of Oscar Wilde and in the spirit of Sally Mann, 
are part of a hypocritical culture that exploits celebrities, shame-
lessly gawking and consuming every bit of information possible, yet 
rejecting the idea when it is thrown in its face; or maybe it’s covert 
NCP.346 
Notwithstanding, an effective NCP law should proscribe the use 
of an identifiable individual’s innocent picture in the production of 
“virtual” or “morphed” NCP, while protecting disclosures made in 
the public interest and content considered as art by the community. 
West may have intended to send a message about fame, but his work 
sends a broader message about where we, as a society, draw lines in 
the development and enforcement of our laws. When it comes to the 
law and art, the lines are muddied, and sometimes what distin-
guishes the legal from the illegal is public perception and points of 
view. What message is being sent? What message is intended? And 
what do we want to hear? 
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